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Abstract—A smart grid is a widely distributed engineering
system with overhead transmission lines. Physical damage to
these power lines, from natural calamities or technical failures,
will disrupt the functional integrity of the grid. To ensure the
continuation of the grid’s operational flow when those phenomena
happen, the grid operator must immediately take steps to
nullify the impacts and repair the problems, even if those occur
in hardly-reachable remote areas. Emerging unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) show great potential to replace traditional human
patrols for regularly monitoring critical situations involving the
safety of the grid. The critical lines can be monitored by a
fleet of UAVs to ensure a resilient surveillance system. The
proposed approach considers the n-1 contingency analysis to
find the criticality of a transmission line. We propose a formal
framework that verifies whether a given set of UAVs (i.e., a UAV
swarm) can perform continuous surveillance of the grid satisfying
various requirements, particularly the monitoring and resiliency
specifications. The verification process ultimately provides a
trajectory plan for the UAVs, including the refueling schedules.
The resiliency requirement of inspecting a point on a line is
expressed in terms of a k−property specifying that if k UAVs
fail or compromised still there is a UAV to collect the data at
the point within on time. We evaluate the proposed framework
on synthetic data based on various IEEE test bus systems.
Index Terms—Smart grid; UAV; surveillance; resiliency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Overhead power lines provide the primary engineering
infrastructure within a smart grid, connecting the substations
and the generation facilities, to transmit electrical energy along
long distances. These transmission lines are distributed from
busy cities to remote country areas, often running through
coastal ranges, deep forests, long rivers, and mountains. Nat-
ural calamities or technical errors can incur physical damages
to the overhead power lines, which can hamper the necessary
energy transmission, leading the system into an unstable or
outage state. The situation worsens when the damage repair
is delayed. Moreover, spatial properties, such as temperature,
elongation, and wind induced conductor motion of the trans-
mission lines are important to be regularly taken care of for
the optimal infrastructure health [1]. An unanticipated natural
catastrophe (e.g., wildfire) or extreme weather can deteriorate
§Rahman and Masum are the co-first author of this paper.
the condition of one or more weak power lines, which can
ultimately cause these lines to break. Frequently monitoring
the health of the system can minimize this possibility .
Power line surveillance is traditionally event-based, i.e.,
when the control center detects an outage, technicians perform
damage assessment by vehicles. An alternative, and recently
widely used, approach is sending trained inspectors by he-
licopters to assess the lines for damage using binoculars or
cameras [2]. However, these approaches are unsafe, especially
during disastrous situations or in the case of remote areas that
are hard to reach. Apart from these drawbacks, the event-based
surveillance delays the response time during hazardous situa-
tions. For power-line health maintenance, spatial parameters
and electrical properties must be frequently monitored [3].
Hence, continuous monitoring of the critical transmission
lines is advantageous, and often a necessity. However, contin-
uous human patrol-based monitoring, even using helicopters,
are infeasible due to its high operating cost and potential safety
factors. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can feasibly replace
the human-based patrols [4], [5], [6]. UAVs are flying internet
of things (IoT) with network connectivity capabilities. The
emergence of UAVs, and particularly the rapid advancement
of their corresponding technology and their increasing cost-
efficiency and availability, makes UAV-based surveillance the
perfect solution for continuously inspecting overhead trans-
mission lines, even in the event-based scenarios.
Transmission lines can be put in a critical overload when
a line trips or a generation outage happens. The overloaded
lines can cause cascading subsequent trips if necessary re-
covery steps are not taken in time. Hence, it is important
to analyze the impact of line trips on the system’s stability.
The contingency analysis, a core component of the energy
management system (EMS) in a smart grid, performs this task
and selects the operating points (e.g., generation dispatches at
different generators) that keep the system in a stable situation
even in contingencies, including transmission line or genera-
tion source failures. Because of the connectivity between the
buses and various loads and generations at the buses different
transmission lines often impact the system differently. Hence,
some transmission lines can be highly critical while a few
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others may not be critical at all. Continuous monitoring of the
transmission lines should consider their respective criticality.
Continuous surveillance includes various requirements.
While surveillance essentially covers the critical points, the
main goal of continuous inspection is maintaining the data
freshness (i.e., the subsequent data/image collected at a point
on the transmission lines should be within a threshold time
frame). The surveillance coverage requirement may include all
the critical points or some of them that together cover at least a
certain portion of the system’s overall criticality. While a UAV
can fail or malfunction due to technical errors, it is vulnerable
to cyber attacks, especially in an adversarial environment.
Therefore, the surveillance resiliency is important. If one or
more UAVs fail or are compromised, the properly functioning
and uncompromised UAVs may not be able to collect and
report data to satisfy a minimal data freshness level.
Appropriate deployment of a set of UAVs, i.e., a UAV
swarm, depends on the feasibility of a trajectory plan for the
UAVs that satisfies the surveillance requirement, k−resiliency
property, and cost-effective fuel usage and refueling making
the scenario a hard combinatorial problem. This research
solves this problem by providing the trajectory plan, along
with the refueling schedule, for each UAV, assuming that each
UAV is connected to a base control center and deliver captured
monitoring data to the base while flying over critical power
lines. In summary, the major contributions of our work are as
follows:
• We propose a formal model to synthesize a plan for con-
tinuous surveillance of overhead transmission lines using
a UAV swarm to satisfy the surveillance requirements.
• We define the criticality of a transmission line leveraging
the contingency analysis. We define the resiliency prop-
erty specifying that a data point is under resilient surveil-
lance even if k UAVs are unavailable or compromised.
• We implement the proposed formal model using SMT [7]
and demonstrate the solution on a synthetic case study,
adapted from an IEEE test bus system [8].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we discuss background of this research and related work. We
present the proposed formal model for surveillance planning
in Section III. We demonstrate the model execution on a
case study in Section IV and present the evaluation results
in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
We briefly discuss about the transmission line surveillance
and line criticality. Then, we present a related literature review.
A. Power Transmission Line Surveillance
The transmission line trips can occur for several reasons,
including equipment aging and natural disasters. Due to aging,
70% of the transmission lines have an average age of 25 to
30 years [9]. Hence, these components need to be inspected
regularly in order to maintain uninterrupted power transmis-
sion to consumers. Severe weather conditions like hurricanes,
tornadoes, and wildfires can cause severe destruction of the
transmission lines, including leaning poles, broken wires, tree
encroachment over lines, etc. These damages affect the electric
supply, and the longer the recovery stage, the larger the
financial loss. Although natural calamities cannot be controlled
in spite of forecasts, damage assessment needs to be addressed
as far out and as quickly as possible. Incidents like animal
attacks, strong winds, and construction work can also trip a
power line. A regular, continuous monitoring process will help
quickly gather information about such incidents.
In addition to the above scenarios, adversaries can attack
the control center by making injurious operating decisions,
which can overload the transmission lines, ultimately leading
to the destruction of equipment. A frequent or continuous
surveillance may detect the potential failure and save the line
from being tripped, and thereby the system from an outage.
B. Transmission Line’s Criticality Analysis
EMS is the core component of the bulk energy management
in a smart grid and consists of several interdependent com-
putational modules [10], [11]. EMS executes these modules
based on the measurement data received from the field devices
and accordingly control the grid (e.g., generation set-points)
for operational security and economic efficiency. Contingency
analysis (CA) is one of the core EMS modules. The goal of
CA is to operate the power system securely by analyzing the
system subject to a contingency (e.g., transmission line outage)
and determine the set-points that will allow system operation
without violation of constraints. Typically, n− 1 contingency
analysis is performed where n is the total number of nodes
(either transmission lines or generation sources) and one node
failure is considered [10], [11]. The analysis considers the
failure of each transmission line and checks its impact on the
system, e.g., whether the rest of the transmission lines become
overloaded. In this respect, some lines are more critical than
the rest as one of failures often have more negative impacts
on the system than some others.
We usually compute the criticality of a transmission line
using line outage distribution factors (LODFs) [10], [11].
However, these factors depend on the topology, electrical
properties of the lines, and loads and generation dispatches
at the buses. A change in the load or the generation dispatch
impacts the criticality of the system. The calculation of LODFs
is briefly presented in Appendix A for the interested readers.
All the outage cases are ranked according to a performance
index (P) calculation. Let L be the set of all lines in the
system, Pl be the power flow through line l, and P¯l be the
flow capacity of the line. If Ll,lˆ defines the LODF for line l
after an outage of line lˆ, the change in the power flow (∆Pl)
on line l due to this failure can be found as: ∆Pl,lˆ = Ll,lˆ×Pl.
If the ultimate power flow, Pˆl,lˆ, will be Pˆl,lˆ = Pl+∆Pl,lˆ. Now,
if n is a suitable index, for a contingency, e.g., the outage of
line l′, the simplest form of the index, i.e., Pl′ , will be as
follows [11]: Plˆ =
∑
l∈L
(
Pˆl,lˆ/P¯l
)2n
.
A larger P for a line shows that it has a higher criticality
than that of a line with a smaller P . In this way, P values help
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Fig. 1. Overhead power transmission lines in a smart grid.
rank the transmission lines per their critical sensitivities. There
are improved ways of calculating P for better understanding
of the critical contingencies [12].
C. Related Work
We discuss the existing literature related to this research in
different categories as follows.
UAV-Based Surveillance Technique. Srinivasan et al. pre-
sented the idea of video surveillance using cameras and
sensors leveraging UAVs in a project with the Florida Depart-
ment of Transportation [4]. The video images contain traffic
information on the roads and are transmitted by UAVs using
the microwave IP network. Latchman et al. proposed that
UAVs, equipped with a GPS location set and surveillance
capabilities, can take direction from the ground control station
and determine necessary altitude calculations for surveillance
using airborne sensors [13]. Jaimes et al. provided some
aspects of the real-time image recognition task based on the
videos sent from the preassigned GPS coordinate-programmed
UAVs [14]. UAVs were used in a project by Moreno et al. to
monitor marine environments in the Mexican seashore using
cheap sensors and less power-consuming buoys [5].
Power Line Surveillance. Traditionally, electric utilities send
technicians by vehicles to the potential damaged areas for
inspecting the towers. Ma et al. discussed an alternative
approach, in which trained inspectors are sent by helicopters
to inspect lines using binoculars or cameras and record
data to a log book for further analysis [2]. However, this
approach still unsafe in extreme weather conditions and
can be still inefficient for remote, unpassable areas. Sev-
eral latter works discussed the use of UAV-based monitor-
ing instead of traditional human patrol methods. A project
named Hydro-Quebec LineScout Technologyapplied remotely-
controlled mobile robots/UAVs to perform basic power line
inspection and maintenance tasks [15], [16]. Li et al. presented
a knowledge-based power line detection method from the
captured images so that UAVs can be utilized for surveillance
and inspection systems [17], [18]. Pagnano et al. proposed
an automated surveillance mechanism for the transmission
lines, leveraging UAVs/robots that rolled on the wires [19].
This real-time inspection methodology uses the image and
signal data processing, allowing the detection of faults or
abnormalities on the lines. A UAV-based system for high
voltage power line inspection is presented in [20], where
for real-time error reporting, quadcopters were equipped with
color cameras controlled from the ground control station.
Optimal Surveillance Design. Semsch et al. proposed a two-
stage mechanism: (i) constructing a covering point set and (ii)
exploring trajectory based on UAV motion through the points,
which can control flights for autonomous multi-UAVs to allow
maximum surveillance [21]. The mechanism looks for a set
of paths so that, in case of obstacles, a minimum area will
be uncovered, giving the adversaries fewer opportunities for
exploitation. Lim et al. targeted the challenges associated with
using UAVs to scan power lines from a distance and send the
damage data to the control center [22]. The authors presented
a solution to minimize overall inspection time and cost by
prepositioning the UAVs optimally. However, the approach is
event-based, allowing for monitoring disaster situations with
the prepositioned UAVs. Deng et al. proposed a multi-platform
cooperative UAV system as well as a multi-model communi-
cation system for power line inspections in China [23]. The
authors considered several design challenges, particularly the
delay between image capturing.
UAV’s Surveillance Security. The UAV monitoring system
can succumb to cyber attacks that allows sensitive data to be
collected by the adversaries. Birnbaum et al. presented a real-
time behavioral monitoring procedure that can convert a flight
plan to behavioral profiling [24]. Abbaspour et al. demon-
strated the safety-critical issues and corresponding detection
mechanisms for the UAV-based surveillance with respect to
several faults and sensor-spoofing attacks [25].
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Fig. 2. The solution approach for resilient surveillance planning and analysis.
D. Contributions
While the existing literature presented techniques for UAV-
based surveillance of power transmission lines, an automated
and efficient trajectory planning mechanism for continuous
surveillance is important, especially when different lines can
have different criticality levels, and these levels frequently
change with the change in the topology, loads, or generation
dispatches. Since some UAVs can fail or be compromised,
resiliency of the surveillance against such events is crucial.
However, automated synthesis of a resilient surveillance plan,
i.e., trajectories of a fleet of UAVs, including their refueling
schedules, under a resource limitation is a combinatorially hard
problem. This research provides a solution to this complex
problem by formally modeling the continuous and resilient
surveillance properties as a constraint satisfaction problem.
Fig. 2 shows the proposed resilient surveillance planning
framework. A formal model is developed and solved to pro-
vide a routing strategy, along with a refueling plan, for the
UAV fleet satisfying the continuous and resilient surveillance
requirements and corresponding constraints.
III. RESILIENT SURVEILLANCE MODEL
In this section, we present the system model and define the
resilient surveillance accordingly.
A. System Model
The UAVs do the continuous surveillance of the transmis-
sion system by flying over (within a safe distance) the power
lines [26]. We assume that each UAV’s surveillance trajectory
follows the bus topology. A line is divided into several
segments, with each segment (link) connecting two points.
We assume a fixed segment length, and hence, the number
of segments or points on a transmission line represents its
physical length. The surveillance is modeled through visiting
these points. Each UAV, identified using an ID, possesses a set
of properties like its average speed, fuel capacity, initial fuel,
and starting position on the line topology. In this modeling,
we also assume that all UAVs maintain the same speed on
an average throughout the surveillance period irrespective of
the altitude differences or necessary turns between the points.
However, different UAVs may need different fuel consumption
to maintain the speed.
Let P denote the set of points on the network and U be
the set of UAVs to perform the surveillance. Moreover, Pl
(Pl ⊆ P) is the set of points on line l and Segp,p′ denotes if
points p and p′ are connected. Since the UAVs have the same
speed, the same amount of time will be taken to cover each
segment. We consider this required time as one time unit. The
surveillance will be modeled for a period of (analysis) time,
say S time units, where s (1 ≤ s ≤ S) will identify a particular
time step. Each UAV u has a fuel capacity (FuelCapu) and
it starts surveillance with an initial fuel (InitFuelu) from a
specific point (InitPointu). Let Fuelu,s be the remaining fuel
of UAV u at step s, FFuelu be the fuel required to fly a
segment (i.e., fuel consumption at each time unit), and HFuelu
be the fuel required for hovering during a time step. We use
TBp to denote the time steps to go to the base or the (closest)
refueling station from point p for refueling.
B. UAV Trajectory Model
Let Visitu,p,s denote whether UAV u is visiting point p at
time s (s > 1). UAV u can visit point p at s (> 1) in two
cases. In the first case, the UAV is already there (i.e., if it
is hovering/loitering), and it has sufficient fuel for hovering
during the time step. In the second case, the UAV is at point
p′ that is connected to point p (Segp′,p is true), and it has
sufficient fuel to fly there. In both of the cases, the sufficient
fuel requirement also includes the fuel needed to fly to the
iv
refueling station from the visited point (p). This constraint
ensures that no UAV will be out of fuel and be stranded. We
formalize the first case (Hoveru,p,s) as follows:
Hoveru,p,s → Visitu,p,s−1∧
(Fuelu,s = Fuelu,s−1 −HFuelu)∧
(Fuelu,s ≥ FFuel × TBp)
In the second case (Flyu,p,s), the fuel consumption cost
depends on the climbing angle of the segment (Segp′,p). This
impact of climbing angle (upward or downward) on the fuel
consumption is abstracted using a ratio (CRatiop′,p) of the
required cost to fly that segment over that of flying the
same length of a horizontal segment. The following equation
presents the corresponding formalization:
Flyu,p,s →
∨
p′∈P,p′ 6=p
Segp′,p ∧Visitu,p′,s−1 ∧
(Fuelu,s = Fuelu,s−1 − FFuel × CRatiop′,p) ∧
(Fuelu,s ≥ FFuel × TBp)
Therefore, visiting a point p at time s by UAV u (Visitu,p,s)
is defined as follows:
Visitu,p,s → Hoveru,p,s ∨ Flyu,p,s (1)
We assume that if no UAV partially covers a segment partially,
i.e., if the UAV starts flying from a point over a segment, it
reaches the end point of the segment. The same is true about
hovering at a point during a time step. The initial location (at
s = 1) of each UAV u is identified at some point p on the
topology according to its initial (current/given) placement.
A point is connected with two or multiple points. At a
particular time step, one UAV can only choose one segment.
The constraint is formalized as follows:
∀u,p,sVisitu,p,s →
∧
p′∈P, p 6=p′
¬Visitu,p′,s (2)
Visitedp,s denotes whether point p has been visited by any
UAV at step s. Hence:
Visitedp,s →
∨
u∈U
Visitu,p,s (3)
C. Refueling Model
The refueling of a UAV is modeled by abstracting its path
from a point p to the base or a refueling station and sub-
sequently returning to a point p′. For simplicity of presenting
the refueling model, we assume only one refueling station. The
path distance from a point to the refueling center is often more
than one time step (TBp). We define ToRefuelu,p,s to denote
that UAV u is moving to the station from point p at time s
for refueling, RefuelTou,p,s to represent the return of UAV u
after the refueling to point p at time s, and Refuelu,s to specify
UAV u is refueling at the station at time s. If ToRefuelu,p,s
is true, then the following equation holds:
ToRefuelu,p,s →Visitu,p,s ∧ Refuelu,s+TBp
∧
∧
p∈P
∧
s<s′≤s+TBp
¬Visitu,p,s′
 (4)
We also need to ensure that Refuelu,s is true only if there
is a valid ToRefuelu,p,s−TBp for some point p. Similarly, if
Refuelu,s is true, then the following equation must hold:
Refuelu,s →
∨
p∈P
Visitu,p,s+TBp ∧ RefuelTou,p,s+TBp
∧
∧
p∈P
∧
s<s′<s+TBp
¬Visitu,p,s′
 (5)
It is also ensured that RefuelTou,p,s is true only if there is a
valid Refuelu,s−TBp , and this p is the only return point for
this particular refueling.
We assume that a UAV refuels to its capacity. The remaining
fuel after refueling, more appropriately after returning to point
p for resuming the surveillance task, is computed as follows:
RefuelTou,p,s → Fuelu,s = FuelCapu−FFuelu×TBp (6)
D. Continuous Surveillance
The continuous surveillance for a point requires that it is
always visited at least once within a (given) threshold period
of time (TC ). In other words, each pair of two consecutive
visits to this point is done within TC . Let Surveilledp denote
whether point p is continuously surveilled in S. In this case,
if point p is visited at time s, the next visit to this point needs
to be at some time s′ within TC :
Surveilledp →
∧
1≤s≤(S−TC )
Visitedp,s
→
∨
s<s′≤(s+TC )
Visitedp,s′
(7)
To make the continuous surveillance true from the beginning
(to initiate the above equation to act for all points), Surveilledp
must also ensure that starting from the beginning within the
threshold time there is at least one visit to point p:
Surveilledp →
∨
1≤s≤TC
Visitedp,s
E. Resilient Surveillance
A point is under k−resilient surveillance if it is visited by
k + 1 (different) UAVs within a (given) threshold time (TR)
throughout the surveillance period. We define that point p is
under resilient surveillance (ResVisitedp,s) at time s (for the
time period TR) if the following equation holds:
ResVisitedp,s → Visitedp,s∧
(
∑
u∈U
VisitDuringu,p,s,TR ≥ (k + 1)) ∨ ((s + TR) ≤ S))
Here, VisitDuringu,p,s,TR denotes that whether point p is
visited by u during the period from s to TR. That is:
VisitDuringu,p,s,TR → ((s+TR) ≤ S)∧
∨
s≤s′≤s+TR
Visitu,p,s′
v
Then, the continuous monitoring requirement is ensured for
resilient surveillance by the following constraint:
ResSurveilledp → Surveilledp ∧∧
1≤s≤(S−TR)
ResVisitedp,s →∨
s<s′≤(s+TR)
ResVisitedp,s′
(8)
F. Criticality Coverage Requirements
The objective of the surveillance is to continuously monitor
the transmission system (e.g., power lines, generators, or other
physical components) such that the surveilled points cover at
least a threshold part of the overall criticality. We define the
criticality coverage score as the criticality of the points under
continuous surveillance over the total criticality of the system.
We consider that a point on a line will have the same criticality
weight, PC p), as that of the line, LC l, which can be equal
to Pl (Section II-B) or a scaled value (for further details, see
Appendix B):
∀p∈PlPC p = LC l
However, for a point at which two or more lines connected
(i.e., at a substation), the criticality weight will be the maxi-
mum of the corresponding lines’ weights.
If CS denotes the minimum requirement of the criticality
coverage score for the continuous surveillance, then the fol-
lowing should be satisfied:∑
p∈P Surveilledp × PC p∑
p∈P PC p
≥ CS
For an arithmetic operation on boolean parameters, we assume
boolean “true” and “false” as integer 1 and 0, respectively.
The resilient (continuous) surveillance requirement is often
different than that of the continuous surveillance because
the former considers a contingency or attack scenario. If
RCS denotes the required criticality score under the resilient
surveillance, then we have the following constraint:∑
p∈PResSurveilledp × PC p∑
p∈P PC p
≥ RCS
G. Repetition of Surveillance Plan
Since the surveillance is continuous and the model considers
a particular surveillance period, the operator may repeatedly
follow the same trajectory plan or execute the model for
continuous surveillance periods considering the last execution
result as the input for the next run. This is because the model
cannot be solved efficiently for a long surveillance period as
the number of clauses grows rapidly with the time steps.
In the first case, when the same trajectory plan will be exe-
cuted constantly, we can achieve this requirement by ensuring
a couple of constraints at the end of the surveillance period
(i.e., at time step S). First, each UAV u must return to its
starting position (InitPointu). Second, the remaining fuel of
the UAV at time S needs to be equal to or greater than its
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Fig. 3. The example overhead transmission line infrastructure.
initial stored fuel. The following equation formalizes these
two constraints:
Visitu,InitPointu,S ∧ (Fuelu,S ≥ InitFuelu)
Lastly, to ensure the continuous surveillance between the
last visit to a point in one cycle and the first visit to the point
in the next cycle, we redefine Equation (7) as follows:
Surveilledp →
∧
1≤s≤S
Visitedp,s
→
∨
s<s′≤(s+TC )
Visitedp,(s′%S)
Similarly, Equation (8) will be updated.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND A CASE STUDY
We briefly discuss the implementation of the model and
present a synthetic case study.
A. Implementation
We use the SMT logic [7] to encode the formalization
presented in the previous section. The encoded model is solved
using Z3, an efficient SMT solver [27]. The solution to the
model gives a result primarily as sat or unsat. In the case
of sat, we receive the detailed trajectory planning that can
successfully perform the surveillance task, satisfying the con-
straints. More specifically, the terms Visitu,p,s, ToRefuelu,p,s,
Refuelu,s, RefuelTou,p,s, and Fuelu,s provide the trajectory
paths and refueling plans, including remaining fuels. The
developed program reads necessary inputs (i.e., data about the
bus topology, the transmission line infrastructure, the UAV
fleet, and surveillance requirements) from a text file. The
required outputs are printed on different text files.
B. Case Study
We consider a synthetic overhead power line infrastructure
based on the IEEE 14-bus test system [8]. There are 14 buses
and 20 lines in this test system. The power line infrastructure
is shown in Figure 3, where each transmission line is divided
vi
Table I
CASE STUDY INPUT (PARTIAL)
# Number of Buses, Lines, Points, and Segments, Segment Length in Time Units,
Number of UAVs, Surveillance Period
14 20 59 65 1 5 91
# Load Information (Bus No, Load)
4 93.0
5 66.0
7 66.0
9 91.0
10 93.0
. . . . . . . . .
# Generation Information(Bus No, Generation)
1 121.0
2 18.0
3 57.0
. . . . . . . . .
# Transmission Line Info (From-Bus, To-Bus, Reactance)
1 2 0.05917
1 5 0.22304
2 3 0.19797
2 4 0.17632
2 5 0.17388
3 4 0.17103
4 5 0.04211
. . . . . . . . .
# Maximum Criticality (PI Score) Distance
15 %
# Line Point Set
1 15 16 17 2
1 18 19 20 5
2 22 23 24 4
2 21 3
2 25 26 5
. . . . . . . . .
# Segments/Links (End Points, Fuel Cost Ratio)
1 15 1.0
15 16 0.95
16 17 1.0
17 2 1.12
1 18
. . . . . . . . .
# UAV Properties (Initial Point, Stored Fuel, Fuel Capacity (Watt), Mileage
(Fuel/Step), Hovering Cost (Fuel/Step))
10 1200 1500 15 3
5 600 1200 12 3
14 300 1500 15 6
30 1050 1500 12 3
. . . . . . . . .
# Threshold Time between Two Consecutive Visits to a Point
25
# Resiliency Requirements (k, Threshold Time)
2 45
# Minimum Criticality Scores under Continuous Surveillance and Resilient Surveil-
lance
80 50
into multiple segments according to its assumed length. There
are 65 equal-length (1 mile) segments, each connecting two
points on the transmission lines. The points are numbered from
1 to 59. There is a fleet of 5 UAVs to perform the surveillance.
The surveillance period is 91 time units/steps. As we assumed
in the modeling, each segment is covered in a time step,
although the fuel consumption/cost of covering a particular
segment depends on the type (mileage property) of the UAV
and the climbing angle for this segment. The partial input
file corresponding to this case study is presented in Table I.
According to the load and generation information of the buses,
there are 5 generation buses (i.e., buses 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8). The
transmission line information includes the end buses and the
impedance (reactance) for each line.
Overhead transmission line infrastructure information in-
cludes the set of points that constitutes each line. For instance,
line 1 is constituted of points 1, 15, 16, 17, and 2. The segment
or link information more specifically provides information
about the segment: the end points and the fuel cost ratio to
fly from the first point to the second point in one time step.
The ratio is taken over the cost of flying the same distance
horizontally (climbing angle is zero). For example, the fuel
cost required to fly the segment from point 1 to point 15 is
normal, while the flying cost from point 15 to point 16 is 5%
less. The cost ratio is inverted if the flying direction is the
opposite. The UAV information consists of a set of properties
for each UAV, which includes its starting position, initial
stored fuel, fuel capacity, and fuel costs per step for flying
(when the climbing angle is zero) and hovering/loitering. It
is worth mentioning that these property values are synthetic
and driven from practical sources, particularly considering
HyDrone UAVs [28], [29], [30].
As the surveillance requirements, we consider (i) contin-
uous surveillance threshold as 25 time steps, (ii) 2-resilient
surveillance and corresponding threshold as 45 time steps
(i.e., a point under resilient surveillance must be visited by
k + 1 (3) different UAVs in 45 units), and (iii) the minimum
scores under continuous surveillance and resilient surveillance
respectively as 80% and 50%.
The solution to the corresponding formal model provides
a sat result and provides the trajectory plan, including the
refueling schedule. The result shows three criticality levels.
According to the trajectory plan, 45 points are under contin-
uous surveillance, covering around 81% of criticality, while
28 points are under resilient surveillance, covering over 50%
of criticality. During the continuous surveillance, all the high
(level 3) criticality points (13 points), three-quarters of the
medium (level 2) critical points (17 points), and 65% of
the low critical points are under coverage. The 2-resilient
surveillance covers around 62% of the high critical points (8
points), 48% of the medium critical points (11 points), and
40% of the low critical points. Due to the distribution of the
higher critical lines in the topology and a limited number of
UAVs, many less-critical points are also covered compared
to high-critical points. If we consider the UAV visits to a
particular point, e.g., point 3, the result shows that the point
is visited at time step 7 by UAV 1 and so on as follows ([at,
by]): [7, 1], [14, 4], [38, 2], [50, 3], [64, 1], and [74, 1]. These
visits satisfy not only the continuous surveillance requirement
but also the resilient surveillance condition, ensuring the visits
of three (k = 2) UAVs followed (and including) from each visit
within the threshold time. If we consider point 2, we find that
it is only continuously surveilled ([5, 1], [8, 2], [25, 2], [27,
2], [37, 3], [48, 3], [56, 5], [81, 1], and [88, 2]). The point
is visited quite a few times but not by a required number
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Fig. 4. The minimum number of UAVs to perform the continuous surveillance depends of (a) the criticality coverage requirement and (b) the distribution of
criticality among the transmission lines.
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Fig. 5. Impact of the grid size (i.e., the number of buses) on (a) the minimum number of UAVs required for the surveillance and (b) the maximum criticality
achieved with a fixed number of UAVs.
of different UAVs within the threshold time. The output also
includes the refueling schedule for the UAVs. According to
this schedule, for example, UAV 2 goes for refuels at point
9 between times 46 and 54 while UAV 3 refuels at point 58
between times 16 and 24.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate the proposed surveillance plan synthesis model
to analyze surveillance characteristics as well as its scalability.
A. Methodology
We analyze the characteristics of surveillance by evaluat-
ing the minimum number of UAVs to perform surveillance
satisfying the criticality coverage requirement and the vice
versa. The evaluation is performed on different synthetic grid
infrastructures, driven from various IEEE test bus systems [8].
We consider the system size as the number of buses. The
scalability of solving the proposed model is evaluated in
terms of the execution time by varying different surveillance
requirements. We run our experiments on an Intel Core i7
machine with 16 GB memory.
B. Evaluation Results: Characteristic Analysis
Impact of the Criticality Coverage Requirement on the
Number of UAVs for Surveillance. The synthesis of the
surveillance plan, i.e., the trajectory of the UAVs and their
refueling schedules, depends on the surveillance requirements,
i.e., the continuous surveillance (data freshness) time thresh-
old, resiliency specification and corresponding surveillance
time threshold, and the criticality coverage requirements, along
with the problem size. The number of UAVs required to
perform the surveillance depends on satisfying all these prop-
erties. The tighter the constraints, the more UAVs are required
to synthesize the surveillance plan. We analyze the impact of
the criticality coverage requirement by the surveilling UAVs
in this respect. The analysis result is shown in Fig. 4(a). The
graph shows that the number of minimally required UAVs
increases with the increase in the coverage requirement. This
is because to cover higher criticality, a larger area (i.e., a larger
set of points) typically needs to be under surveillance. With the
problem size (e.g., the number of buses), this number increases
further. As the figure shows, the minimum number of UAVs
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Fig. 6. Impact of (a) the criticality coverage requirement for continuous surveillance, (b) the size of the UAV fleet (i.e., the number of UAVs), and (c) the
selection of k for resilient surveillance, (c) the time interval for the continuous surveillance, (b) the time interval for the resilient surveillance, and (d) the
surveillance period on the formal model execution time.
required for surveillance in the case of the 30-bus system is
larger than that of the 14-bus system.
Impact of the Criticality Distribution over Lines. The
required number of UAVs to perform the surveillance oper-
ation depends on the scenario about how the critical weights
are distributed over the transmission lines. Fig. 4(b) shows
this impact. In this evaluation, we consider two scenarios as
follows. We order the transmission lines according to their
criticality weights and take two sets of lines, top 30% and 50%
lines, as the two cases. We consider the same total criticality
for these cases. The criticality coverage requirement for the
continuous surveillance is 70%. As the graph for the top 30%
critical lines shows, the more criticality this set of lines hold in
total, the lesser number of UAVs the surveillance job requires.
It is because the UAVs need to consider a smaller set of lines
to meet the criticality coverage requirement for the overall
transmission line topology. We see the same behavior for the
case of the top 50% lines.
Impact of the Grid Size on the Criticality Surveillance.
We analyze the impact of the grid size (i.e., the number of
UAVs) on the maximum criticality coverage by the surveilling
UAVs. The analysis result for two different numbers of UAVs
is presented in Fig. 5(a). The result demonstrates that, for a
specific number of UAVs, the criticality coverage is limited
and with the increased size of the transmission system (i.e.,
the number of buses) the criticality coverage reduces. The
is because a larger system has a larger set of surveillance
points, often more critical points, and these points are widely
distributed in the broader infrastructure. Therefore, for an
increased system size, a particular set of UAVs cannot but
surveilled a reduced part of the system’s criticality while, with
the number of UAVs, the criticality coverage increases (e.g.,
4 UAVs vs. 5 UAVs in the figure).
Impact of the Grid Size on the Number of UAVs. We
analyze the impact of the grid size (i.e., the number of buses)
on the number of UAVs required to cover a particular criti-
cality coverage. We consider 60% and 30% as the criticality
score coverage requirements for continuous surveillance and
resilient (k = 1) surveillance, respectively. The analysis result
for two different resilient surveillance intervals is presented in
Fig. 5(b). In both cases, the continuous surveillance interval
is 25 time steps. The graphs in the figure specify that a larger
grid requires a higher number of UAVs to cover the required
criticality score because the surveillance points in a larger
system are often more widely distributed. We can also observe
in the figure the impact of resiliency surveillance interval on
the number of UAVs. As the figure shows, a larger interval
requirement (i.e., 45 steps) often needs a smaller number of
UAVs than a smaller one (i.e., 40 steps). This is because a
larger interval allows a longer time frame to visit a point k + 1
(2) times, which often reduces the number of UAVs required
to achieve the criticality surveillance score.
C. Evaluation Results: Scalability Analysis
Impact of the Criticality Coverage Requirement. Fig. 6(a)
shows the execution/solving time of the proposed formal
model with respect to the criticality coverage requirement for
14-bus and 30-bus transmission systems. As shown by the
ix
graphs, with the increase in the coverage requirement, the time
to solve the model grows. The higher is the requirement, the
larger the area that needs to be covered, which increases the
execution time. When the requirement is close to the maximum
possible coverage for a set of UAVs, the search space increases
rapidly, which increases the execution time. If a larger set of
UAVs is used for the surveillance, the size of the model (i.e.,
the number of variables and assertions/clauses) also expands.
A larger model requires an increased, often exponentially high,
solving time. A large grid is usually divided into multiple sub-
grids (regional grids) to manage the system in a decentralized
fashion. For a smaller grid, our proposed formal model can
efficiently, even with our limited computing capability, syn-
thesize the trajectory plan for required surveillance.
Impact of the number of UAVs. We evaluate the impact
of the number of UAVs on the solving time for a particular
problem size and a surveillance requirement. Fig. 6(b) presents
the result. We can observe that initially with the increase
in the number of UAVs the execution time reduces. After
a point, the execution time grows rapidly. This is because,
initially an increased number of UAVs eases the searching for
a solution providing more options. However, as the number
of UAVs grows, the number of clauses in the model increases
superlinearly, which ultimately increases the execution time.
Impact of the Resiliency Requirement (k). We analyze the
impact of the k, the resilient surveillance requirement on the
14-bus system. We consider two fleets of UAVs on various k
values for a particular set of surveillance interval and score
requirements. The evaluation result is presented in Fig. 6(c).
As the result shows with the k, the model execution time
increases. Since a point under resilient surveillance needs to be
visited by k+1 UAVs within a specific time frame, a larger k
tightens the solution space, thus increasing the searching time.
Impact of the Surveillance Interval. The solving time of
the proposed formal model depends on the surveillance time
interval (between two consecutive visits) threshold (maxi-
mum). We perform the evaluation varying continuous surveil-
lance and resilient surveillance thresholds. The rest of the
input, including continuous and resiliency surveillance score
requirements, remains the same. The corresponding results are
shown in Fig. 6(d) and Fig. 6(e). We can observe that when
the surveillance interval requirement is relaxed (i.e., with the
increase in the threshold), the time to solve the model reduces.
Impact of the Surveillance Period. The impact of surveil-
lance period (in time steps/units) on the execution time is
presented in Fig. 6(f) and, as the graph shows, the execution
time grows rapidly with the period. Each time step is asso-
ciated with a number of clauses. Hence, if the surveillance
time expands, the number of clauses grows, which ultimately
increases the model solving time.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overhead power transmission lines in a smart grid require
regular assessment for reliable and uninterrupted operation,
especially considering physical (potential) damages due to
natural calamities, aging factors, technical errors, or physical
attacks. The emergence of UAV technology provides the
opportunity to keep this critical infrastructure under contin-
uous surveillance. In this work, we have proposed a formal
framework that synthesizes the trajectory plan as well as the
refueling schedules for a given set of UAVs, performing a
continuous surveillance of the lines to satisfy various critical
line monitoring and resiliency requirements. The resiliency
surveillance requirement for a point ensures that if k UAVs fail
or are compromised, there is still a UAV to collect the data at
the point no later than a threshold time. We have implemented
the proposed model and evaluated the tool’s ability to analyze
surveillance characteristics as well as its scalability.
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APPENDIX
A. LODF Calculation
LODFs represent the sensitivity of a power system during
a contingency condition such as line outages [31]. During the
outage, pre-outage power flowing through the affected line is
distributed to the other lines with respect to a sensitivity factor
matrix, i.e., LODFs. Each element of the matrix represents if
one line is tripped what percent of the power of the affected
line will be shared by another line. Thus, LODFs are used to
calculate the linear impact of contingencies in power system
simulator. Therefore, in a power system during the outage of
l2, post contingency power flow of l1 is:
P postl1 = P
pre
l1
+ Ll1,l2 ∗ P prel2
where P prel1 and P
pre
l2
are the pre-outage power flows of l1
and l2 respectively and Ll1,l2 is LODF of l1 with respect to
the outage of l2.
To calculate the LODF matrix for a power system [32], we
first need to calculate the Y matrix:
Y =

y11 y12 . y1n
y21 y22 . y2n
. . . .
. . . .
yn1 yn2 . ynn
 (9)
with the help of the following equations:
yij = − 1
zij
yii =
n∑
i=1
i6=j
yij
Here, zij is the impedance of the line between bus i and j.
If we assume bus 1 is the slack bus, eliminating the 1st row
and 1st column from Y , we will receive:
Yˆ =

y22 y23 . y2n
y32 y33 . y1n
. . . .
. . . .
yn2 yn3 . ynn
 (10)
The sensitivity matrix, X , is calculated from Yˆ :
X =
[
0 0
0 Yˆ −1
]
(11)
Finally, the LODF of line l1, due to the outage of the line
l2, will be calculated by the following equation
Ll1,l2 =
zij
zkl
(Xil −Xjl −Xik + Xjk)
zkl − (Xii + Xjj − 2Xij (12)
B. Criticality Weight Assignment
The PI value of a transmission line can be considered
directly as the criticality weight. However, loads at the buses
frequently changes and so the criticality values. If the changes
are minor, it is not worthwhile to modify the surveillance
plan. Therefore, it is advantageous to assign qualitative crit-
icality weights ignoring the small variances. In that case,
if K qualitative criticality levels are assumed, one weight
assignment approach can be dividing the criticality scale (from
the minimum to the maximum) into K number of equally sized
ranges. While the first range includes the smallest PI values,
the K’th range has the highest ones. The lines with the PI
values falling within the criticality range i (1 ≤ i ≤ K) are
considered to have the criticality weight i. However, better
approaches are possible like below where the number of
levels (K) can be realized according to the distribution of
the PI values. We present a mechanism below that provides
qualitative weights to the transmission lines, after finding the
minimum value of K.
Algorithm 1 can do weight assignment based on a clustering
method. In particular, the algorithm invokes a procedure
named Algorithm 2 to form a set of clusters from the PIs
following the K-means clustering method [33]. The PI values
xi
Algorithm 1 Criticality-Ranking-Algorithm
Input: X = {x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xN} is the set of data points
(PIs), where N = |L|.
Input: D is the maximum distance (between a data point
and the cluster center) allowed within a cluster.
Input: K is the initial number of ranks (clusters).
Output: Let R = {r1, . . . , ri, . . . , rN} is the set of criticality
weights of the transmission lines.
Let C1, . . . ,Cj , . . . ,CK be the set of clusters to which the
data points are to be assigned. Each cluster Cj has a cluster
center (or mean) cj . Let C = {c1, . . . , cj , . . . , cK}.
Let parameter Status denote if there is a valid clustering.
Initialize: Status := FALSE
while TRUE do
Clustering-Algorithm(X, K + 1)
K := K + 1
Calculate the distance (di,j) between each data point xi
and each cluster center cj .
if The maximum of di,js > D then
if Status = TRUE then
Consider the last cluster
for each Cj do
for each xi ∈ Cj do
ri := cj
end for
end for
return R
else
Clustering-Algorithm(X, K + 1)
end if
else
Status := TRUE
Clustering-Algorithm(X, K − 1)
end if
end while
will be fed to Algorithm 1 as inputs while the qualitative
criticality weights of the transmission lines will be returned.
The lines with the PI values falling within the same cluster
receive the same criticality score, derived from the cluster
mean. The algorithm finds the minimum K based on a
threshold distance value. While the threshold value ensures a
particular score is assigned to a set of lines whose PI values are
close to each other (no more than a distance from the cluster
centroid), the minimization of K reduces the impact of small
variances in PI values (which are also not exact measures of
the criticality) for prioritizing the lines.
Algorithm 2 Clustering-Algorithm
Input: X = {x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xN}.
Input: K, the number of clusters.
Output: Clusters (C1, . . . ,Cj , . . . ,CK) and corresponding
cluster centers or means (C).
Initialize: Cjs are initially empty.
Initialize: cjs are arbitrarily chosen from the data points xis.
while TRUE do
Calculate the distance (di,j) between each data point xi
and each cluster center cj .
Assign xi to the cluster (Cj) with center cj if di,j is the
minimum.
if No change in the members of Cjs then
return C and Cs;
end if
for cj ∈ C do
Update cluster center as cj =
∑
xi∈Cj xi/|Cj |
end for
end while
xii
